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Abstract. This paper offers new insights on the interactions between economics and politics
in Portugal. We use two unexplored data sets consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions for
the main political parties in Portugal and responses to a consumer survey containing a battery
of questions on economic evaluations. The analysis covers the interval from 1986 to 2001.
We find that: (1) right-wing governments are penalized for higher inflation while the left-wing
ones are not, (2) left-wing governments are more penalized for increases in the unemployment
rate; (3) voters base their evaluations of incumbents’ performances on perceptions of past and
current economic conditions, rather than on expected future economic outcomes.
1. Introduction
Following seminal papers by Mueller (1970) and Kramer (1971) for the U.S.
and Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) for the U.K., the analysis of the impact of
economic conditions on politicians’ popularity levels and electoral results has
become one of the most active research fields in public choice. Although the
international literature is already quite extensive,1 there is only one published
paper about the Portuguese case.2 With this research we try to fill this gap
by investigating the determinants of vote intentions for the main parties in
Portugal.
We start by using an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on
vote intentions from 1986 to 2001. Our first set of estimations suggest that (1)
socialist governments had less electoral support than social democratic gov-
ernments; (2) recently elected governments enjoyed a honeymoon period with
the electorate; (3) longer time in office decreased vote intentions favoring the
governing party; (4) unfavorable economic outcomes, especially inflation and
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unemployment, negatively affected vote intentions for the incumbent party,
providing evidence in favor of the responsibility hypothesis.
When testing for partisan interaction effects, we find that social demo-
cratic governments were penalized for higher inflation while socialist govern-
ments were not, but the latter tended to be more penalized for increases in the
unemployment rate. These results are in sharp contrast with Swank’s (1993)
partisan model, since he argues that the right should benefit from higher
inflation and the left from higher unemployment. Thus, Portuguese voting be-
havior seems to comply better with the ideological responsibility hypothesis
of Powell and Whitten (1993). That is, governments tend to be penalized
more severely when they perform poorly with respect to the variable they
considered most important.
Finally, we use data on the consumer survey implemented by the National
Institute of Statistics to test whether Portuguese voters are prospective or ret-
rospective. Results clearly show that the electorate relies on their perceptions
of past and current economic perspectives when evaluating the incumbents’
performance, rather than on expected future outcomes. Thus, voters are
retrospective.
The paper consists of seven sections. Sections 2 and 3 provide some back-
ground on Portuguese parties and on the structure of the political system.
Section 4 describes the data set. Section 5 models the determinants of vote
intentions. Section 6 presents the empirical results and, finally, Section 7
reports the conclusions.
2. Political parties in Portugal3
The military coup of 25 April 1974 re-established democracy in Portugal.
It was followed by a two-year period of severe political instability during
which the Junta of National Salvation and six provisional governments ruled
the country. Following its approval, the new Constitution came into effect on
25 April 1976, and legislative elections were held on the same day. Since
then, four political parties have dominated Portuguese political life. The
center-left Socialist Party – Partido Socialista (PS) and the center-right, or
liberal, People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party – Partido Popu-
lar Democrata / Partido Social Democrata (PPD/PSD) have always been the
two major political parties, alternating in power since 1976.4 The left-wing
Portuguese Communist Party – Partido Comunista Português (PCP) and the
right-wing, or Christian Democratic, Democratic and Social Center / People’s
Party – Centro Democrático e Social / Partido Popular (CDS/PP)5 have con-
tested the third position and, except for brief periods in which CDS/PP was
part of coalition governments, they have been in the opposition. As can be
Table 1. Legislative electoral results
PS PPD/PSD CDS/PP AD PCP Effective number
of partiesa
1975b 37.87% 26.39% 7.61% 12.46% 4.23
1976 34.98% 24.03% 15.89% – 14.5% 4.40
1979 27.43% – – 42.24% 18.96%d 3.44
1980 27.13%c – – 44.4% 16.92%d 3.33
1983 36.35% 27.04% 12.38% – 18.2%d 3.94
1985 20.82% 29.79% 9.74% – 15.55%d 5.04
1987 22.3% 50.15% 4.34% – 12.18%e 3.12
1991 29.25% 50.43% 4.38% – 8.84%f 2.86
1995 43.85% 34% 9.09% – 8.61%f 3.09
1999 44% 32.32% 8.38% – 9.02%f 3.19
2002 37.84% 40.15% 8.75% 6.97%f 3.15
Source: National Elections Commission.
Notes. PS – Socialist Party; PPD/PSD – People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party;
CDS/PP – Democratic and Social Center / People’s Party; AD – Democratic Alliance (PSD
+ CDS + PPM – Monarchic People’s Party); PCP – Portuguese Communist Party. The results
for the smaller parties are not shown. There are usually about a dozen parties competing in the
legislative elections.
aThe Laakso and Taagepera (1979) effective number of parties is equal to 1/(pi)2, where pi
is the percentage of votes obtained by party i.
bThe 1975 elections served to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly, which was as-
signed the draft of the new Portuguese Constitution. The country was still ruled by provisional
governments and the Junta of National Salvation until April 1976.
c Socialist Revolutionary Front (FRS): PS + small socialist parties.
d United People’s Alliance (APU): PCP + MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement).
e Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU): PCP + dissidents of MDP + PEV (Green-Ecologist
Party).
f PCP + PEV
seen in Table 1, these four political parties account for about 90% of the
votes in every election except in 1985, when the Democratic Renewal Party
(Partido Renovador Democrático - PRD) won about 18% of the votes.6
It is also worth noting that since the initial phase of Portuguese democracy,
when a four-party system seemed to be established, there has been a growing
concentration of votes in the two parties closer to the ideological center (PS
and PSD). The combined vote share of the two main parties was 59.1% in the
1976 election but has been above 75% since 1991, and the “effective number”
of parties decreased from 4.23 in 1975 to 3.15 in 2002.7 Thus, it seems that
CDS/PP and PCP occupied the ideological spaces attributed to them in the
voters’ range of preferences, while the two largest parties competed for the
center ground. According to Colomer (1996: 186), in a policy space ranging
from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right), the positions of these four parties
in 1986 were: PCP – 1.8, PS – 4.7, PSD – 7.1, and CDS/PP – 8.5 Although
the PSD seems to be farther away from the center than the PS, its unifying
and centripetal strategy helped consolidate political equilibrium around the
center.
Changes in the social composition of the political parties also contributed
to the transition to a bipartisan system (Magone, 1997). In the early years of
democracy the PS was mainly supported by the new, urban middle classes
and industrial workers. In the following years it expanded its electoral base to
farmers and other social groups, becoming a ‘catch-all’ party. The PSD finds
support in almost the same groups of population. Starting with the farmers in
the northern Portugal and the rural and urban “petty bourgeoisie” in villages
and small towns, it also developed into a ‘catch-all’ party, although with a
more technocratic, center-right image. The Communist Party is essentially a
working-class party, mainly supported by farm and industrial workers from
southern Portugal and the suburbs of Lisbon and Setúbal. The Communists
experienced a gradual decline in their traditional support due to modern-
ization and depopulation of the Alentejo region. In the last two elections
there was also some transfer of votes from PCP to the Left Bloc (Bloco
de Esquerda), a new, more modern, and intellectual leftist party.8 Finally,
the CDS/PP finds support in the higher echelons of the northern farming
community and among entrepreneurs and managers. On the most disputed
elections, the CDS/PP suffered from vote transfers of its usual supporters to
the PSD, following the logic of useful vote.
The instability that characterized the Portuguese democracy until 1987
may have served as a learning experience for voters (Colomer, 1996). They
came to prefer stable governments that have enough parliamentary support
to carry their terms until the end. Thus, they prefer to vote for the major
party (PS or PSD) that is closest to their ideological preferences so that it
has a chance to obtain an overall majority and form a one-party government.
This preference towards more stable governments also contributed to the
concentration of votes in the two major parties.
2.1. Legislative elections and governments
In the first legislative elections for the Assembly of the Republic held in April
1976, the Socialist Party secured a plurality, with 34.98% of the votes. Mário
Soares led the first Constitutional Government and the following two, all of
which fell short of completing their terms. In 1979 the PSD formed the Demo-
cratic Alliance (AD) with the CDS and the Monarchic People’s Party (PPM).
The AD won 42.24% of the votes in that year, getting an overall majority
in Parliament. Sá Carneiro, leader and founder of PSD, became the prime
minister in January 1980. In the October 1980 elections the AD renewed its
overall majority of deputies but, two months later, Sá Carneiro died in an
airplane accident and Pinto Balsemão was elected head of PSD and became
Prime Minister. Divisions among coalition members caused the resignation
of Pinto Balsemão in December 1982, and new elections were scheduled for
April 1983.
In the 1983 balloting, PSD ran alone and gained the second-largest vote
total. It then joined PS in a coalition government that became known as the
“central bloc.” In May 1985, Cavaco Silva was elected head of the Party and
in June the PSD broke the coalition with PS and called for earlier elections. In
July 1985, Mário Soares decided to run for the Presidency.9 Following the fall
of the coalition government, the President dissolved the Assembly and called
for elections in October, in which PSD gained the largest share, with 29.79%
of the votes. Cavaco Silva formed a minority government, which ended in
April 1987 following a no confidence vote.
From 1985 to 1987 Portugal’s economic situation improved considerably.
During the 1987 election campaign Cavaco Silva emphasized the need for
economic and political stability for Portugal’s successful integration into the
European Community.10 The electorate responded favorably to his appeal and
gave PSD 50.15% of the votes in the legislative balloting of July 1987. The
PSD won the first one-party overall majority since the end of the dictator-
ship. That majority was renewed in the legislative elections of October 1991.
During the last mandate, the deterioration of Portugal’s economic situation
and several allegations of government members’ corruption contributed to
the deterioration of the government’s popularity. In February 1995, Cavaco
Silva abandoned the PSD leadership.
In the 1995 legislative elections the Socialist Party got 43.85% of the
votes. António Guterres, the party leader since 1992, became prime minister
of a PS minority government.11 After completing its term,12 the PS had its
best result ever in the 1999 balloting, with 44% of the vote, which gave the
party exactly 50% of the deputies in Parliament. However, the disastrous
results obtained in the municipal elections of December 2001 lead to the
resignation of António Guterres and his government, prompting the President
to dissolve the Parliament and call for legislative elections to be held in 17
March 2002. The PS, under the leadership of Ferro Rodrigues (a minister
of the previous government), finished second in these elections, obtaining
37.84% of the votes, and is now in the opposition. The PSD, under the lead-
ership of Durão Barroso, gained a plurality with a share of 40.15%. It formed
a coalition government with the third party, CDS/PP, which received 8.75%
of the votes.
3. Brief description of the structure of the Portuguese political system
The major governmental entities in Portugal are the President of the Re-
public, the Government, the Assembly of the Republic, and the Courts. The
President of the Republic is elected every five years by absolute majority in
two rounds. The candidates can either run as independents, or be appointed
by political parties. No President can serve for more than two consecutive
terms. The main duties of the President are: to serve as the head of State and
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; to set the dates of legislative
elections after consulting the parties; to appoint the Prime Minister and the
members of the Government suggested by the latter; to dissolve the Parlia-
ment and call for elections; and, to promulgate and have published laws,
decree-laws and regulations. The President also has the power to veto laws
and decrees, or to send them for consideration by the Constitutional Tribunal.
The Government consists of the Prime Minister, the Ministers, the Sec-
retaries of State, and the Under-Secretaries of State. The President usually
consults the political parties and takes into account recent election results
when appointing or dismissing a Prime Minister, who is generally the leader
of the party that received the most votes in the last election. The other mem-
bers of the Government are appointed by the President after being proposed
by the Prime Minister. The Government formulates the general policy of the
country and is the highest organ of public administration. It has political,
legislative, and executive powers. Its legislative power consists of proposing
laws to the Assembly and issuing decrees. Its executive power extends to
the execution of the general plans of activities and budgets of the State. The
Government is responsible to both the President, who can dismiss it, and to
the Assembly of the Republic, which must approve its plans and budgets and
may dismiss it by passing a censure motion.
The Assembly of the Republic is the Portuguese unicameral Parliament,
currently composed of 230 deputies elected for a period of four years by direct
and secret universal adult suffrage. Parties present closed and blocked lists of
candidates in each district and there is a proportional transformation of votes
into seats, using the Hondt method.13 Since the deputies are subject to strong
party discipline, act only through their groups, and may not change group,
parliamentary life is dominated by the party leaderships (Colomer, 1996).
The duties of the Assembly include (among others): enacting legislation in
all areas except those reserved to the Government; approving amendments
to the Constitution; approving the Government’s general budget and plan of
Table 2. Legislative elections and parties in government since 1985
Dates of Winning Share in Prime Form of
elections party Parliament Minister government
5 October 1985 PSD 34% Cavaco Silva One party, minority
19 July 1987 PSD 59% Cavaco Silva One party
6 October 1991 PSD 58% Cavaco Silva One party
1 October 1995 PS 48% Anto´nio Guterres One party, minority
10 October 1999 PS 50% Anto´nio Guterres One party, “minority”
17 March 2002 PSD 46% Durão Barroso Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP)
Source: National Elections Commission.
Note. PSD – Social Democratic Party; PS – Socialist Party; CDS/PP – Democratic and Social
Center / People’s Party.
activities; passing motions of confidence in or censure of the Government;
and appointing ten of the thirteen members of the Constitutional Tribunal.
4. The data
The period analyzed in this paper begins in June 1986 and ends in June 2001.
It includes three terms of social democratic governments and two terms of
Socialist governments. Table 2 describes the winning parties of legislative
elections since the balloting of October 1985.
Vote intention data was obtained from a weekly national newspaper called
Expresso. The source data are from polls conducted on a monthly basis by
Euroexpansão employing a representative sample of about 600 Portuguese
adults and conducted by telephone interviews. Economic data consists of
monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted and standardized; con-
sumer price indices; industrial production indices; real exchange rates; and
a confidence indicator. Most were collected from OECD – Main Economic
Indicators. Exchange rates were obtained from IMF – International Financial
Statistics and data on the Portuguese Consumers Survey was collected from
the National Institute of Statistics (INE).
5. Explaining vote intentions
The model we propose to explain vote intentions includes the following ele-
ments: measures of economic conditions, leader characteristics, effects of
time in office, and partisan considerations.
5.1. Economic performance
According to the pioneering work of Downs (1957), voters chose rationally
between alternative candidates or parties. They analyze past and announced
policies of each candidate in order to make inferences about future decisions.
Then, each voter casts his/her vote for the candidate that is associated with the
highest expected utility. Because even a rational voter may not find it practical
to collect all the information on past and announced policies and their pos-
sible consequences, Kramer (1971) and Frey and Schneider (1978) assumed
that voters’ decision rules are based on more readily available information.
That is, they vote for the incumbent if they are satisfied with his/her economic
performance, and vote against if otherwise. If we assume that past and current
economic performances are good predictors of future outcomes, this behavior
is consistent with expected utility maximization.14
Although the hypothesis that voters hold incumbents responsible for eco-
nomic outcomes is well established in the literature and has been tested in a
variety of contexts and formulations over the past thirty years, the develop-
ment of its theoretical foundations in models with rational expectations has
been more recent. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) developed a competency model
in which the ability of parties to generate favorable economic outcomes dif-
fers. Since knowledge of ability is private information, competency cannot
be observed directly by the electorate. Thus, voters base their evaluations
and vote decisions on the incumbent’s past policies. Similarly, in Alesina
and Cukierman (1990), voters are not fully informed about the incumbent’s
preferences and do not observe his/her policy actions directly. However, since
policy outcomes are positively correlated with policy actions, they convey
information about the incumbent’s preferences. Therefore, the assumption
of persistence of preferences implies that voters can draw inferences about
future policies and outcomes by looking at current economic conditions.
Harrington (1993) combines the two above-mentioned models by assum-
ing that voters are uncertain about the effectiveness of policy actions, about
the incumbent’s future policy intentions, and about which policy the incum-
bent believes its best. Voters’ preferences are endogenous and may change as
new information is released. In such a setting, the electorate will be more
sensitive to policy actions (as in Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) when it feels
more confident about which policy is best, or more able to identify the con-
sequences of policy actions. Voting behavior will be more performance-based
(as in Alesina and Cukierman, 1990) when voters are more uncertain about
the effectiveness of the policies chosen.
The latter case, in which voters are more uncertain of the effectiveness
of policies, seems to be the most appropriate assumption for the Portuguese
case. There are several reasons why this is so. First, the economic programs
of the two biggest parties (PS and PSD) are somewhat similar and the main
policy actions proposed by them are seldom clearly explained. Second, it is
not unusual for Portuguese politicians to make promises during campaigns
that are not fulfilled after the elections. Finally, Portugal’s literacy ratio is
the lowest of the European Union and is among the lowest of the OECD.
This may imply that the degree of uncertainty about the effects of eco-
nomic policies is greater in Portugal than in most of the other industrialized
countries.
As a consequence, we expect to observe performance-based voting beha-
vior. Since our dataset consists of polls results that, according to Nannestad
and Paldam (1994: 229) tend to reflect a greater degree of voter myopia than
election results, we hypothesize that voters’ evaluations of the incumbents’
performances are based on current economic conditions. The vector of vari-
ables we use to measure current economic conditions includes, among others,
the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, and the confidence indicator.15 All
variables are lagged one month because it takes time for economic data to be
released and for individuals to recognize changes in economic conditions.
5.2. Leader characteristics
These are taken into account by including a dummy variable for each gov-
ernment leader. In this way, we control for leaders’ personalities, charisma,
or other characteristics that may influence vote intentions for his/her party. In
fact, electoral scholars commonly accept the proposition that more popular
leaders increase party vote intentions.16
5.3. Time in office
Time in office can influence vote intentions in several ways. First, recently
elected parties may benefit from a honeymoon period with the electorate.
This may result from the fact that the public recognizes that the incumbent
is not responsible for the economic conditions that prevail during the first
few months of his/her administration (see Smyth, Washburn, and Dua, 1989:
338). We control for honeymoon effects by including a variable that takes
the value of six in the first month of each term, declines to one by the sixth
month and takes the value of zero thereafter. Second, ruling is costly in terms
of popularity and, therefore, we expect vote intentions to decline with time in
office. That happens because the incumbent’s policy actions, even if always
supported by a majority of the electorate, will tend to alienate some voters
(Mueller, 1970; and Frey and Schneider, 1978). As more and more minorities
are alienated, it becomes possible for a clever opposition to forge a coalition
able to overthrow the incumbent. Thus, the government’s popularity will tend
to decrease with time, as some of its former supporters get hurt by its policies
and turn to the opposition. Since it is impossible to please everybody at the
same time regardless of what the incumbent does, some people will not ap-
prove his/her actions. Another cause for gradual popularity decay pointed by
Mueller (1970) is that much more is promised during campaigns than what
can be achieved. Then, some time after an election, people become disappoin-
ted as the incumbent fails to deliver all that he/she promised. Cost of ruling
effects are controlled for by including a variable measuring the number of
months in office or dummy variables for each term in office.
In sum, our baseline empirical model can be described by equation (1),
where VIt, the dependent variable, is the percentage of vote intentions for
the incumbent party at time t, (L)VIt−1 are lags of the dependent variable,
LEADER is a vector of dummy variables for party leaders, TIME is a vector
of variables that capture honeymoon and cost of ruling effects, and ECO is a
vector of economic variables that represent current economic conditions.
VIt = α + β(L)VIt−1 + φLEADERt + ηTIMEt + γ ECOt−1 + ut (1)
5.4. Partisan effects
Because individuals’ vote intentions may depend upon the ideology of the
incumbent (Powell and Whitten, 1993; and Swank, 1993), the economic
variables are interacted with dummy variables indicating which party was
in office (PARTY∗i ECO). The following equation is estimated in our tests for
partisan effects:
VIt = α+β(L)VIt−1+φLEADERt+ηTIMEt+δi(PARTYi∗ECO)t−1+ut (2)
The underlying idea goes back to Hibbs’ (1977) partisan theory, according
to which politics is about the distribution of income and, when in office,
parties adopt policies that favor their constituencies. Hibbs admits that left-
wing parties are mainly supported by the lower classes of the population that
suffer the most with unemployment, while conservatives tend to find support
in the upper classes that mainly dislike inflation. Therefore, the left concen-
trates on improving real economic conditions, while conservatives are more
concerned with price stabilization.
Powell and Whitten (1993) and Swank (1993) use different approaches
to introduce partisan considerations into the vote functions literature. The
former authors argue that a government should be held more responsible for
the variables that it, or its constituency, care about the most. Since right-
wing governments are relatively more worried with the evolution of inflation
than with that of unemployment, they will be more penalized when inflation
rises. Likewise, left-wing governments are more penalized for increases in
the unemployment rate. Alternatively, Swank (1993) assumed that vote inten-
tions should shift depending upon which party’s policy bias is best-suited for
current economic conditions. Consequently, left-wing oriented parties should
benefit from increases in unemployment and right-wing parties should gain
support when inflation rises.
5.5. Retrospective versus prospective voting
Finally, we investigate whether vote intentions depend on retrospective or
prospective evaluations of economic performance. On this matter, the results
found in the literature are not conclusive. According to Nannestad and Paldam
(1994: 228) “it appears that past events work almost the same as expected
future ones in explaining vote decisions.”
In this paper, data on the responses to seven questions of the Portuguese
Consumer Survey are used to construct variables that reflect past and current
economic conditions and expected future outcomes (see Appendix 1). The
equation estimated is:
VIt = α + β(L)VIt−1 + φLEADERt + ηTIMEt + θCSt + ut (3)
Where CS is a vector of variables taken from INE’s Consumer Survey.
6. Results
In this section we present OLS estimations of the models described above.
We start by considering as dependent variable the vote intentions for the gov-
erning party. Then, we consider the government lead over the main opposition
party, followed by the estimation of a SUR model of the vote intentions for
the four main political parties.17 Finally, a discussion of the results obtained
when using data from the Consumer Survey is presented.
6.1. Vote intentions for the governing party, government lead, and main
opposition party
In our sample period, only two parties were in power (the PSD, until October
1995, and the PS afterwards), and all governments were single party. Results
for our first set of estimations, using as dependent variable the percentage of
vote intentions for the party in government, are shown in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 3.
Table 3. Vote intentions for the party in government and government lead over the
major opposition party
Vote intentions for the Incumbent’s lead over
incumbent party the major opposition
party
1 2 3 4
Constant 32.28 36.50 26.24 33.70
(5.18)∗∗∗ (4.82)∗∗∗ (3.93)∗∗∗ (3.44)∗∗∗
VI_Gov (–1) .56 .52
(8.95)∗∗∗ (8.06)∗∗∗
Gov_Lead (–1) .60 .53
(11.12)∗∗∗ (8.55)∗∗∗
Guterres / PS –5.65 –7.95 –7.91 –9.69
(–2.93)∗∗∗ (–2.09)∗∗ (–2.71)∗∗∗ (–1.60)
H_Gov .62 .63 .64 .70
(2.52)∗∗ (2.49)∗∗ (1.59) (1.66)∗
Time_Gov –.08 –.10 –.12 –.17
(–4.13)∗∗∗ (–3.89)∗∗∗ (–4.46)∗∗∗ (–4.19)∗∗∗
Inflation (–1) –.62 –.92
(–3.21)∗∗∗ (–3.13)∗∗∗
(Inflation∗PS) (–1) –.04 .05
(–.12) (.10)
(Inflation∗PSD) (–1) –.81 –1.29
(–3.13)∗∗∗ (–3.02)∗∗∗
Unemp_Rate (–1) –.70 –1.29
(–2.89)∗∗∗ (–3.54)∗∗∗
(Unemp_Rate∗PS) (–1) –1.12 –2.35
(–2.55)∗∗ (–3.53)∗∗∗
(Unemp_Rate∗PSD) (–1) –.80 –1.41
(–2.51)∗∗ (–2.58)∗∗
Adjusted R2 .75 .77 .79 .79
# Observations 176 175 175 176
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission.
Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses;
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%; ∗∗, 5%, and ∗, 10%;
Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors and cov-
ariance;
Models estimated by OLS.
In the estimation reported in column 1, we use as independent variables
the first lag of the dependent variable (VI_GOV),18 a dummy (Guterres/PS)
that takes the value of one when Guterres is Prime Minister and zero other-
wise, a variable accounting for honeymoon effects (H_GOV), the number of
months in office (Time_Gov), and one-month lagged values of the inflation
rate (Inflation)19 and of the unemployment rate (Unemp_Rate). Results show
that vote intentions for the party in office are positively affected by their
value in the last month and by honeymoon effects. They also suggest that
vote intentions are smaller when Guterres is Prime Minister (PS is in office),
and that they tend to decrease with time in office20 and with increases in
inflation or unemployment.21 Results regarding inflation and unemployment
clearly support the responsibility hypothesis. Estimated coefficients associ-
ated with these two variables are negative and statistically significant at the
1% significance level.
Partisan effects are taken into account in the estimation of column 2 by
multiplying the economic variables by dummy variables for the incumbent
party. Results indicate that PSD governments are penalized for higher infla-
tion, while PS governments are not. They also indicate that the latter tend to
be more penalized for increases in the unemployment rate. These results are in
sharp contrast with Swank’s (1993) partisan hypothesis, according to which
the right should gain more support when inflation rises and the left would
be favored when unemployment increases. Our findings are consistent with
the ideological responsibility hypothesis of Powell and Whitten (1993). They
argue that a government should be held more responsible for the variables
that it, or its constituency, care about the most.
The results of estimations that use the difference between the percentage
of vote intentions for the party in office and that for the major party in the
opposition as the dependent variable are shown in the last two columns of
Table 3. Their similarity to those of the first two columns reinforces our
conclusions. We have also analyzed vote intentions for the major opposition
party, although these results are not reported in the paper. As expected, the
significance of the variables was the same as for vote intentions for the gov-
erning party, and the signs of the estimated coefficients were symmetrically
opposite.
6.2. Vote intentions for the four main parties
In this subsection, we performed estimations of vote functions for the four
main political parties. Since vote intentions on one party may be correlated
with those on other parties, the four equations were estimated as a system us-
ing the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique. The explanatory
variables are those of the previous regressions. Results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Vote intentions on the four main political parties
PPD/PSD PS CDS/PP PCP
Constant 15.84 44.95 –2.83 2.75
(2.49)∗∗ (7.06)∗∗∗ (–.92) (1.03)
Vote Int. (–1) .48 .43 .62 .30
(10.27)∗∗∗ (7.39)∗∗∗ (11.53)∗∗∗ (4.68)∗∗∗
Gov_PSD 19.57 –41.65 2.42 –3.76
(2.58)∗∗ (–6.09)∗∗∗ (.67) (–1.20)
H_PSD 1.28 –.54 –.10 .26
(6.13)∗∗∗ (–3.40)∗∗∗ (–1.00) (3.00)∗∗∗
H-PS –.37 .48 .08 –.20
(–1.51) (2.45)∗∗ (.66) (–1.86)∗
Time_Gov_PSD –.09 .09 .01 .003
(–5.31)∗∗∗ (6.39)∗∗∗ (1.54) (.54)
Time_Gov_PS .007 –.24 .05 .01
(.13) (–5.14)∗∗∗ (1.83)∗ (.63)
Inflation (–1)∗Gov_PSD –.71 .57 –.005 .34
(–3.51)∗∗∗ (3.81)∗∗∗ (–.06) (4.16)∗∗∗
Inflation (–1)∗Gov_PS –.32 .60 –.03 –.21
(–.80) (1.92)∗ (–.18) (–1.22)
Unemp_Rate (–1)∗Gov_PSD –.61 .71 .29 .40
(–2.01)∗ (3.00)∗∗∗ (2.03)∗∗ (3.16)∗∗∗
Unemp_Rate (–1)∗Gov_PS –.03 –2.75 .64 .17
(–.04) (–4.14)∗∗∗ (1.58) (.51)
Adjusted R2 .84 .88 .67 .59
# Observations 176 176 176 176
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission.
Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses;
significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%; ∗∗, 5%, and ∗, 10%;
Models estimated by SUR.
The main conclusions suggested by the analysis of these estimations are
the following. First, as expected, PSD and PS receive a greater percentage of
vote intentions when in government, while vote intentions on the CDS/PP
or PCP do not seem to depend on the governing party. Second, the PSD
gains and the PS losses support during the honeymoon period of PSD gov-
ernments (H_PSD = 1). The PS gains support during its honeymoon periods.
Third, PSD governments lose support the longer they are in government
(Time_Gov_PSD). PS governments also lose support the longer they hold
office (Time_Gov_PS), and gain support the longer the PSD is in government.
Fourth, higher inflation reduces favorable vote intentions for the PSD (when
it is in government) and increases those for PS and PCP. Since our estimations
show that only PSD governments were penalized for higher inflation, it is not
surprising the parties of the opposition (or that stayed most of the time in the
opposition) are benefited by inflation increases. Fifth, the PS and the PSD are
penalized when unemployment increases during their governments, and the
PSD gains support when unemployment rises when it is in the opposition.
As in our tests for partisan effects reported in Table 3, PS governments are
more penalized for unemployment increases than PSD governments. Finally,
CDS/PP and PCP, which were in the opposition during the entire sample
period, gain support when unemployment rises during PSD governments (the
estimation coefficient is also positive during PS governments, but it is not
statistically significant). These results provide some additional evidence in
favor of the responsibility hypothesis. Voters blame incumbent parties for
bad economic results and, therefore, during economic hardships, opposition
parties’ receive more support.
6.3. Vote intentions using INE’s Consumer Survey
Finally, we investigate whether voters are prospective or retrospective in their
evaluations of incumbents’ economic performance. As far as we know, this
issue has never been investigated for the Portuguese case. We use for the
purpose the National Institute of Statistics’s (INE) monthly Consumer Sur-
vey, which consists of twelve questions. Data from seven of those questions
are used in our estimations. They are related to the past and expected future
economic situation of the household or country, inflation, and unemployment.
A complete description of these variables is given in Appendix 1.
Since the economic situation of the households tends to be highly correl-
ated with that of the country, and most people have rather static expectations,
it is not surprising that there is high correlation between some of the variables
resulting from the Consumer Survey (see the correlation matrix in Appendix
2). This makes it difficult to include more than one variable concerning the
past or expected economic situation of the country/household in the same
estimation, since it may lead to problems of multicollinearity.
The empirical results are presented in Table 5. The estimation of column
1 includes the evolution of the economic situation of the household in the
last 12 months and the expectations for the next 12 months, together with
the political explanatory variables used in the estimations of Table 3. Vote in-
tentions on the incumbent party increase when the situation of the household
improved during the previous year, but do not seem to depend on the expecta-
tions for the next year. Exactly the same happens in the estimation of column
2, where the economic situation of the country is under consideration, instead
of that of the household. Thus, it seems that Portuguese voters rely more on
the recent evolution of the economic situation than on their expectations when
evaluating the incumbent’s performance. That is, they are retrospective.
Since the past and expected economic situations are highly correlated, the
previous estimations may suffer from problems of multicollinearity. Thus, we
decided to test for prospective or retrospective behavior using other combin-
ations of variables. First, we used the perceived price increases in the last
12 months and the unemployment rate22 to represent recent economic condi-
tions, and the expected price increases and evolution of unemployment for the
next 12 months to represent future expected economic conditions (see column
3). As in the previous equations, only the variables representing the past are
statistically significant. Second, in the estimation of column 4, we used the
evolution of the economic situation of the household in the last 12 months
and the expectations for the evolution of prices and unemployment. Only
the first variable was statistically significant. The same happens in column
5, where we used the situation of the country instead of that of the household.
Fourth, we used the expected economic situation of the household together
with perceived past inflation and the unemployment rate (column 6). Again,
only the variables representing the past and current economic situation are
statistically significant. The same results were obtained in column 7, where
we used the expected situation of the country instead of that of the household.
In sum, there is clear evidence of retrospective voter behavior in all the
estimation results shown in Table 5. Concerning the other variables, there
is again evidence of personality, honeymoon and time effects on the vote
intentions on the party in government.
7. Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the determinants of vote
intentions in Portugal. Do the Portuguese blame incumbents for the evolution
of the economy? Does time in office influence vote intentions? Are parties
held equally responsible for economic outcomes? Are voters retrospective or
prospective? These are some of the questions that provided the starting point
for the research. In order to answer them, we used two unexplored data sets
consisting of vote intentions obtained from monthly polls performed since
1986 and of the results of the INE’s monthly Consumer Survey.
Our paper provides additional light on the interactions between econom-
ics and politics in Portugal. In previous research, Veiga (1998) estimated
popularity functions for the main political entities in Portugal. She found
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strong evidence in favor of the responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment,
and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting popularity levels. Results found
in this paper corroborate this conclusion: vote intentions in the incumbent
party increase when the economy is performing well, while vote intentions in
the opposition rise in the reverse case. Concerning partisan considerations,
estimation results suggest that the Social Democrats are penalized for in-
creases in inflation while the socialists are not, and that the latter are penalized
more severely for increases in unemployment. These results clearly contradict
Swank’s (1993) partisan hypothesis but provide support for the ideological
responsibility hypothesis of Powell and Whitten (1993).
According to the survey of Nannestad and Paldam (1994), there is no clear
pattern on whether voters are prospective or retrospective. On the contrary,
our results clearly reveal that Portuguese voters are retrospective.
Our analysis also shows that: (1) PS governments had less electoral sup-
port than PSD governments; (2) governments enjoyed a honeymoon period
with the electorate during the first months of incumbency; (3) vote intentions
for incumbent parties tend to decrease with time in office.
Notes
1. See Lewis-Beck (1988) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for surveys on vote-popularity
functions, and Person and Tabellini (2000) for a recent survey on political economics. For
a dissenting view that considered general economic conditions unimportant for election
outcomes, see Stigler (1973).
2. Veiga (1998) estimated popularity functions for the Portuguese President of the Republic,
Prime Minister, Government and Parliament.
3. For a more complete description of the evolution of the Portuguese political system, see
Magone (1997), Colomer (1996), and several issues of Arthur Banks’ Political Handbook
of the World and of the World Europa Yearbook.
4. The Socialist Party was founded in 1875, declared illegal during the dictatorship (1926–
74), re-emerging after the 1974 Revolution. The People’s Democratic Party was founded
in May 1974 and adopted its current designation of Social Democratic Party (PSD) in
1976.
5. Founded in 1974, the Democratic and Social Center added the designation of People’s
Party in 1993. It is a right-wing Christian democratic and conservative party. The Por-
tuguese Communist Party was founded in 1921, banned in 1926, and legalized again
in 1974. Since 1979, it formed several coalitions with small left-wing parties. The fact
that it always fought for the establishment of a socialist regime in Portugal, in line with
the revolutionist ideas of 1974, and rejected all revisions of the 1976 Constitution has
prevented it from entering government coalitions. According to Magone (1997) the PCP
has behaved as a “anti-system” party.
6. The PRD was a center-left party tacitly supported by the President Ramalho Eanes. In the
1987 election PRD’s vote share decreased dramatically to 5% and it almost disappeared
in the 1991 elections.
7. We used the measure of the effective number of parties suggested by Laakso and
Taagepera (1979). This means that parties are weighted by their size (here, the percentage
of votes cast). The effective number of parties is equal to 1/(pi)2, where pi is the
percentage of votes obtained by party i.
8. The Left Bloc managed to elect two deputies in 1999 and three in 2002.
9. In February 1986, Mário Soares won the second runoff of the most closely contested
presidential election so far. He became the first civilian President of the Republic since
1974 and was re-elected in 1991.
10. Portugal joined the European Community on 1 January 1986.
11. In January 1996, Jorge Sampaio, also a former PS leader, succeeded Mário Soares in the
Presidency. He was re-elected in January 2001.
12. This was the first time in the Portuguese Republic that a minority government completed
a four-year term.
13. This electoral system benefited the two major parties, which are over-represented in terms
of the number of seats in comparison with the proportion of votes cast. While the CDS and
the PCP were generally not affected by the use of the Hondt method, the smaller parties
have a hard time electing any deputies.
14. Fair (1978) created a vote model that combines these two views. His estimations of vote
functions for the U.S. president indicated that current economic conditions affect votes
for the President. Voters did not seem to look back very far and did not consider the
past performance of a non-incumbent party. See Kirchgässner (1986) for an alternative
theoretical model of the popularity function.
15. The confidence indicator is the average of consumer responses to a set of five questions
regarding personal and national, present and future, economic conditions, extracted from
the Portuguese Consumer Survey. These questions and the construction of the confidence
indicator are described in Appendix 1.
16. See Lanoue and Headrick (1994) for a study focusing on Great Britain. Frey and
Schneider (1978) used dummy variables to control for the popularity level of each U.S.
president in their path-breaking study of popularity functions.
17. Unit-root tests performed for these series indicate that all of them are stationary. The
t-statistics of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were: –4.53 for the vote intentions in the
government party; –3.82 for the government lead; –3.34 for the main opposition party;
–3.05 for PS; –3.34 for PSD; –3.80 for CDS/PP; and –3.49 for PCP. Since the critical
values are –3.46 (1% level) and –2.87 (5% level), the hypothesis of a unit root is clearly
rejected for all the above-mentioned variables.
18. The number of lags of the dependent variable was chosen according to their statistical
significance, in order to minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC),
and to avoid problems of autocorrelation.
19. The inflation rate is defined as the percentage change in the Portuguese consumer price
index since the same month of the previous year (homologous inflation rate).
20. Separating time in office for the PS and the PSD reveals that vote intentions for both
governing parties declined with time in office in the same way (the hypothesis of equal
coefficients cannot be rejected). When using dummy variables for terms in office, there
is clear evidence that favorable vote intentions decrease over consecutive terms. If we
include two variables accounting for honeymoon effects, one for PS and another for PSD
governments, only the latter is statistically significant. All results, not reported here, are
available from the authors upon request.
21. Other economic variables for which monthly data is available, such as the confidence
index, the change in the industrial production index and in the real exchange rate, were
added to the estimations. They are seldom statistically significant and results, not reported
here, did not change significantly.
22. The INE’s Consumer Survey does not include a question on perceived unemployment.
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Appendix 1
The seven questions from the National Institute of Statistics’s (INE) monthly
Consumer Survey that we use in this paper are the following:
1. In your opinion, during the last 12 months, your household’s (family)
economic situation . . .
a improved a lot
b improved a little
c did not change
d worsened a little
e worsened a lot
f does not know
2. In your opinion, during the next 12 months, your household’s (family)
economic situation . . .
a. will improve a lot
b. will improve a little
c. will not change
d. will worsen a little
e. will worsen a lot
f. does not know
3. In your opinion, during the last 12 months, the general economic
situation of the country
a. improved a lot
b. improved a little
c. did not change
d. worsened a little
e. worsened a lot
f. does not know
4. In your opinion, during the next 12 months, the general economic
situation of the country . . .
a. will improve a lot
b. will improve a little
c. will not change
d. will worsen a little
e. will worsen a lot
f. does not know
5. In your opinion, during the last 12 months, prices . . .
a. increased a lot
b. increased
c. increased a little
d. did not change
e. decreased a little
f. does not know
6. In your opinion, having the current situation in mind, do you think
prices, during the next 12 months . . .
a. will increase more rapidly
b. will increase as much as now
c. will increase less rapidly
d. will stay the same
e. will decrease slightly
f. does not know
7. In your opinion, during the next 12 months, national unemployment . . .
a. will increase a lot
b. will increase a little
c. will not change
d. will decrease a little
e. will decrease a lot
f. does not know
For each question, the result is the weighted difference of the percentages of positive
and negative answers, using the following equation:
Qi = (a + 0.5b) − (0.5d + e) (4)
where a,b,d and e are the percentages of respondents choosing the respective options.
Confidence indicator
The Confidence Indicator corresponds to the simple arithmetic average of the results
obtained for five questions of the Consumer Survey: questions 1 to 4, shown in the
previous page, and the following question:
8. Do you think that, for people in general, this is a good time to buy
important durable goods, such as furniture, washing machines, TV sets,
VCRs, computers, etc.?
a. Yes, it is a good time
b. It is neither a good nor a bad time
c. No, it is not a good time. Those acquisitions should be postponed
d. does not know
The result for this question is the difference between the percentage of respond-
ents choosing option a and option c. That is:
Q8 = a − c (5)
Then, the Confidence Indicator is obtained using the following equation:
CI = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4 + Q8)/5 (6)
Appendix 2
Correlation matrix: Data on the first seven questions of the Consumer Survey
Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7
Q1 1.00000
Q2 0.85369 1.00000
Q3 0.93390 0.89532 1.00000
Q4 0.80934 0.95718 0.91517 1.00000
Q5 0.02153 0.10747 0.04071 0.02650 1.00000
Q6 –0.04375 –0.28544 –0.17452 –0.40850 0.51535 1.00000
Q7 –0.83320 –0.66293 –0.72650 –0.62785 –0.08003 –0.04018 1.0000
